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grateful to the University of Florida Levin College of Law, and especially to Professors Alyson
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Environmental Conference, In Fairness to Future Generations. Conference topics, which ranged
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central themes of intergenerational equity and conservation of resources for the future. I was
charged with setting the stage for a series of panel discussions on sustainable river management.
This Essay builds on that presentation. I am also indebted to Professor Klein for her insightful
comments and to Kate Saunders for her research assistance.
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ESSAY
A TALE OF TWO IMPERILED RIVERS: REFLECTIONS FROM A
POST-KATRINA WORLD
Sandra Zellmer*
Let the river run;
let all the dreamers
wake the nation.1
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I.  INTRODUCTION
Last year, hundreds of thousands of residents of the lower Mississippi
River basin were forced to flee Hurricane Katrina.  Having scattered like2
leaves before the gale-force winds that pounded the Gulf Coast, many are
600 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59
3. Spencer S. Hsu, FEMA Extends Housing Aid to Those Displaced by Storms: Assistance
Will Continue Through at Least August, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 20, 2007, at A11, available at 2007
WLNR 1180675.
4. See Norman A. Dupont, New Orleans After Katrina: A Superfund Site?, 20 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’T. 38, 41-42 (2006) (exploring the use of a Superfund designation to clean up
New Orleans); Beth Daley, La. Ecological Harm Called Unprecedented, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 30,
2005, at A1, available at 2005 WLNR 15425207; U.S. EPA, Response to 2005 Hurricanes: Test
Results, http://www.epa.gov/katrina/testresults/index.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2007) (summarizing
results of sediment and water quality sampling).
5. Editorial, Katrina’s Unlearned Lessons; A Government Agency Admits Error, and
Congress Wants to Reward It, WASH. POST,  June 7, 2006, at A22 [hereinafter Katrina’s Unlearned
Lessons]. The nine-volume, 6000-page report, costing nearly $20 million, was made available to
some lawmakers on June 1, 2006, and was delivered to Congress on July 10, 2006. Gulf Coast
Hurricane Disaster; GAO Reports Massive FEMA Aid Fraud; Other Developments, FACTS ON FILE
WORLD NEWS DIG., June 15, 2006, at 470C1; News Release, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Army
Forwards Preliminary Technical Report on Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration to
Congress (July 10, 2006), http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/cepa/releases/lacpr.htm.
6. Katrina’s Unlearned Lessons, supra note 5.
7. Id.
8. Id.
still displaced by the wreckage caused by storm surges and floodwaters.3
Those who have returned continue to experience the adverse effects of a
shattered infrastructure as they attempt to rebuild their homes and their
lives. The environmental calamity is profound: drinking water sources
polluted by destroyed septic systems and leaking storage tanks;
contaminated sediments from the bayous to the residents’ backyards;
decimated marshes and oyster beds—in short, an ecology turned inside
out.4
Hurricanes are a natural phenomenon in this region. Why were the Gulf
Coast communities so vulnerable? The answer to this question is
frustratingly elusive. One might understandably believe that, as a
developed nation, the United States has the most sophisticated
technologies at its fingertips and first-rate environmental laws to ensure
appropriate implementation through open public processes. Yet in
actuality, there were serious failures at every level of government.
One year after Hurricane Katrina, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
responded to a congressional request for an accounting with a report
admitting culpability for much of the devastation of New Orleans.  Its5
structural defenses failed not because Congress had authorized only
moderate Category-3 protection, which in turn let floodwaters overflow
the city’s levees, but because the levees and floodwalls simply collapsed.6
The report revealed a multitude of design errors.  The network of federal7
and local structures was a haphazard “system in name only,”  where8
floodwalls and levees of varying heights used mismatched materials that
2007] REFLECTIONS FROM  A POST-KATRINA WO RLD 601
9. Ann Carrns, Holes in the Dike: Long Before Flood, New Orleans System was Prime for
Leaks, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 2005, at A1.
10. Robert Sanders, UC Berkeley-Led Levee Investigation Team Releases Final Report at
Public Meeting in New Orleans, May 24, 2006, http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/
2006/05/24_leveereport.shtml; INDEPENDENT LEVEE INVESTIGATION TEAM FINAL REPORT,
INVESTIGATION OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE NEW ORLEANS FLOOD PROTECTION SYSTEMS IN
HURRICANE KATRINA ON AUGUST 29, 2005, at 15-5 (2006), available at
http://www.ce.berkeley.edu/~new_orleans/.
11. See Carrns, supra note 9.
12. See Mark Schleifstein, Corps Report Ignores Call for Specifics; Details of Category 5
Protections Left Out, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), July 1, 2006, at 1, available at 2006 WLNR
11442605; Katrina’s Unlearned Lessons, supra note 5; KEITH BEA, EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL
AP PR O PR IAT IO N S FO R  HU R R I C ANE  KATR INA RE LIE F (2006) ,  available at
http://www.fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/71874.pdf (detailing congressional appropriations
for Katrina recovery); See also American Bar Ass’n, Letter to Stephen L. Johnson re: Legislation
Creating Exemptions to Environmental Laws and Regulations, p.5, Nov. 21, 2005, available at
http://www.abanet.org/environ/katrina/Whitepaper.pdf (opposing waivers proposed in various
Senate Bills introduced by Lousiana Senators Vitter and Landrieu and others). Although these bills
did not pass, several exemptions were granted by adminstrative action. See, e.g., Department of
Homeland Security, National Environmental Policy Act Alternative Critical Physical Infrastructure
Arrangements in New Orleans LA, 71 Fed. Reg. 14712 (Mar. 23, 2006) (adopting alternative
procedures to avoid full compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act for reconstruction
grants); U.S. EPA, Letter to Governors of Florida, Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi,
Emergency Fuel Waiver, Aug. 30, 2005 ( allowing refiners, distributors, and outlets to supply diesel
fuel and gasoline without complying with Clean Air Act requirements on a temporary basis),
available at http://www.epa.gov/region6/6xa/pdf/fuel_waiver_slj_tif.pdf; infra note 186 (describing
controversy over waiver of landfill requirements).
13. See infra Part III (detailing federal laws that govern the Corps’ activities).
did not properly interface.  Construction engineers failed to account for the9
gradual sinking of native soils, leaving the levees vulnerable to
floodwaters.  For their part, the local levee districts failed to ensure that10
necessary repairs on levees and floodgates were completed or that pumps
would continue functioning during a catastrophic storm event.  Instead of11
fanning the flames of reform, the Corps’ report prompted Louisiana’s
senators and their congressional allies to appropriate tens of billions of
dollars for the construction of more and higher levees and to seek
exemptions from federal environmental requirements.12
This response is all too typical. The management mission of the Corps
does not reflect a cohesive national water policy; rather, it arises from the
piecemeal, pork-barrel conglomeration of multiple-use statutes.  The13
vacuum created by the lack of a coherent federal management vision
allows and even encourages federal, state, and local actors to scramble for
money and power while avoiding responsibility and shifting blame. If we
look beyond the Gulf, the catastrophic consequences of the lack of a
cohesive federal policy can be seen throughout the nation. Due to dredging
and channeling for flood control and commercial navigation, much of the
602 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59
14. BRUCE BABBITT, CITIES IN THE WILDERNESS 52 (2005).
15. Sandra B. Zellmer, A New Corps of Discovery for Missouri River Management, 83 NEB.
L. REV. 305, 337-47 (2004).
16. See Robert Costanza & Michael Mageau, What is a Healthy Ecosystem?, 33 AQUATIC
ECOLOGY 105, 105 (1999).
17. See infra Part V (describing an organic act for the Interior Rivers Ecosystem).
18. See BABBITT, supra note 14, at 46; Corps of Engineers Overview,
http://www.lre.usace.army.mil/planning/overview.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
19. National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (2000).
20. National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
21. National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd-668ee
(2000).
22. Reclamation Act (National Irrigation Act of 1902), 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-498 (2000).
23. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (Bureau of Land Management Organic
Act), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785 (2000).
24. A. Dan Tarlock, A First Look at a Modern Legal Regime for a “Post-Modern” United
States Army Corps of Engineers, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1285, 1285-86 (2004).
Missouri River, for example, is now “a dead snake, rigid, unable to move,
constricted by the levees along its banks.”14
In other works, I have proposed the development of a federal
preservation strategy for the interjurisdictional waters of the Missouri
River.  This essay integrates the Mississippi River, as it makes its 2,300-15
mile journey from northern Minnesota to its delta in southern Louisiana.
Just as common problems face the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers, there
may just as well be common solutions. In fact, any lasting solution that
secures sustainability and intergenerational equity likely requires a large-
scale, basin-wide strategy—a federal Interior Rivers Ecosystem Act that
governs the management of the Missouri-Mississippi River system.
This statute must be comprehensive in two senses. First, it must
recognize and reflect the close linkage between ecosystem integrity and
human well-being.  Second, it must be a true organic act that establishes16
an adaptive, holistic federal strategy for these two intertwined,
interjurisdictional rivers.  More specifically, the Act should provide clear17
parameters for the management activities of the Corps of Engineers. The
Corps is the nation’s oldest water-resources agency and one of the largest
federal land-management agencies;  yet unlike the National Forest18
Service,  the National Park Service,  the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,19 20 21
the Bureau of Reclamation,  and the Bureau of Land Management,  the22 23
Corps lacks an organic act to cabin its discretion. 
There are two significant impediments to a comprehensive federal
Interior Rivers Ecosystem Act. One is the Corps’ love for the “rational”
sciences of engineering and economics, particularly cost-benefit analysis
(CBA).  The other impediment is federalism. Congress, the state24
legislatures, the federal agencies, and the courts hide behind both as a
means of evading responsibility for protecting and conserving the integrity
2007] REFLECTIONS FROM  A POST-KATRINA WO RLD 603
25. BABBITT, supra note 14, at 115, 128-31; Gerald E. Galloway, Perspectives on a National
Water Policy, WATER RESOURCES UPDATE, Nov. 2003, at 6, 8.
26. See infra notes 217-20 and accompanying text.
27. See American Rivers, River Facts, http://www.americanrivers.org/site/
PageServer?pagename=AMR_content_cc04 (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
28. See U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, The Mississippi River and Tributaries Project,
http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/pao/bro/misstrib.htm (last visited Feb 17, 2007).
29. See Zellmer, supra note 15, at 311.
of the nation’s water and water-dependent resources. The result has been
degraded waterways, disastrous flood events, a crumbling national
infrastructure, and potentially irreversible losses of biological diversity and
ecological resilience.25
Sustainable transboundary management measures are feasible in spite
of these obstacles. A nuanced application of CBA can play a role in
resilient, equitable decisionmaking when employed as a supplemental,
rather than predominant, decisionmaking factor. And a dynamic view of
federalism—a pragmatic, interactive strategy of governance with clear
lines of authority and incentives for cooperation and innovation among and
between federal, state, local, and tribal entities—should encourage, rather
than obstruct, more coherent leadership in conservation policy. Moreover,
there is precedent for adopting a comprehensive strategy for a major
interjurisdictional river system, as legislation and interstate compacts have
embraced such strategies in other basins.26
This Essay begins in Part II with a snapshot of the historical events and
physical characteristics that shaped the Missouri and Mississippi River
basin communities. Part III then explores the existing management matrix
of federal laws governing the Corps of Engineers’ activities in these
basins. Part IV demonstrates how CBA and federalism have obstructed
integrated, sustainable management strategies. This Essay concludes in
Part V with an assessment of how these obstructions can be overcome in
a post-Katrina world and with suggestions for an Interior Rivers
Ecosystem Act.
II.  CROSSING MUDDY WATERS
The Missouri and the Mississippi Rivers lie at the very heart of our
nation, and they are connected in more ways than might initially meet the
eye. Together, they form the largest river system in North America,  and27
they drain more than forty percent of the land base of the continental
United States.  The Missouri is the longest tributary of the Mississippi,28
supplying vast quantities of fresh water from the Rocky Mountains and the
Great Plains.  The two rivers support an abundance of endemic fish and29
wildlife species and form the primary flyway for millions of migratory
604 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59
30. See id. at 320-21; Mississippi National River and Recreation Area, Mississippi River
Facts, http://www.nps.gov/archive/miss/features/factoids (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
31. See American Rivers, River Facts, supra note 27; National Park Service, River and Water
Facts, http://www.rivers.gov/waterfacts.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
32. See DESOTO NAT’L WILDLIFE REFUGE, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FINAL
COMPREHENSIVE CONSERVATION PLAN 22 (2001), available at http://www.fws.gov/midwest/
planning/desoto/desotoccp%20ch3.pdf; MISS. VALLEY DIV., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS,
MISSISSIPPI RIVER NAVIGATION: HISTORY (1985), available at http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/
pao/history/MISSRNAV/.
33. See John A. Robb, Economic and Environmental Challenges, WATER RESOURCES
UPDATE, Autumn 1994, at 17, 18.
34. On a personal note, my interest in these rivers arose at an early date. I grew up boating
and camping on the Missouri River and learned to appreciate the power, beauty, and ephemeral
nature of its current and its sandbars, snags, and banks. My affiliation with the Mississippi River
also stems from early roots. My family often traveled to various campsites in Minnesota to fish the
streams and lakes in and around the Mississippi’s headwaters at Lake Itasca. My parents
honeymooned at Lake Itasca fifty-five years ago, and in my office I keep a framed photograph of
my mother, age eighteen, stepping on stones placed across the tiny stream that eventually forms the
“Mighty Mississippi.” Years later, as a visiting professor at Tulane Law School, I lived in the
uptown area of New Orleans, where I bicycled on the levee near Audubon Park and satiated myself
on seafood delivered by shrimpers and oystermen from the Gulf. These two rivers have been a
constant source of wonder and wildness throughout my life, just as they have been a powerful
influence in the lives of generations of people in this country.
35. MARK TWAIN, THE ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN (Grosset & Duniap, Inc. 1963)
(1884). For an account of Twain’s experiences as a “cub” riverboat pilot before the Civil War and
his subsequent dismay upon traveling the river years later, see MARK TWAIN, LIFE ON THE
MISSISSIPPI 44-53, 486-96 (1883). While traveling from St. Louis to New Orleans, Twain found
all the markings of “greed, gullibility, tragedy, and bad architecture.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LITERATURE 681 (Merriam-Webster, Inc. 1995).
36. See James Sullivan, Destined for Mystery; LaSalle Not Aboard When Griffon Sailed into
Storm—and History, S. BEND TRIB., Apr. 10, 2005, at F8.
birds.  These two rivers can also claim the dubious distinction of being30
the most heavily altered river systems in the country, requiring immediate
rescue efforts and continuing life support.31
Common themes of navigation and westward expansion flow through
both river systems. Management of the rivers has been indelibly marked
by the dream of a lucrative navigational corridor  and the desire to hold32
back the flood waters to protect extravagant development in the
floodplains.33
The rich history of the Mississippi River is interwoven with that of the
Missouri River.  Anyone familiar with The Adventures of Huckleberry34
Finn  appreciates the Mississippi’s role in the life of nineteenth-century35
America. Yet the Mississippi’s significance to the nation’s culture and
aspirations extends back much further in time.
French explorers René-Robert de La Salle and Father Louis Hennepin
traversed the upper Mississippi in the late-seventeenth century.  Hennepin36
located and named the Falls of St. Anthony, where Minneapolis is now
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37. Id.
38. See Virtual Museum of New France: Louis Hennepin, http://www.civilization.ca/vmnf/
explor/henn_e2.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
39. Texas State Library & Archives Commission, Texas Treasures—Robert Cavelier, Sieur
de La Salle, http://www.tsl.state.tx.us/treasures/giants/lasalle/lasalle-01.html (last visited Feb. 17,
2007). “No river has played a greater part in the development and expansion of America than the
Mississippi.” MISS. VALLEY DIV., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, supra note 32.
40. See Roger K. Ward, The Louisiana Purchase, 50 LA. B. J. 331, 332-34 (2003); Zellmer,
supra note 15, at 310-11 (citing STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, UNDAUNTED COURAGE 101 (1996)).
41. Zellmer, supra note 15, at 310-12.
42. Id. at 311-12.
43. Id. at 310-12. See generally DANIEL B. BOTKIN, BEYOND THE STONY MOUNTAINS:
NATURE IN THE AMERICAN WEST FROM LEWIS AND CLARK TO TODAY (2004) (describing the
Missouri River as seen by the Corps of Discovery from St. Louis to Three Forks).
44. MISS. VALLEY DIV., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, MISSISSIPPI RIVER NAVIGATION:
STEAMBOAT NAVIGATION (1985), available at http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/pao/history/
MISSRNAV/steamboat.asp [hereinafter STEAMBOAT NAVIGATION].
45. MISS. VALLEY DIV., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, MISSISSIPPI RIVER NAVIGATION:
RIVER COMMERCE (1985), available at http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/pao/history/MISSRNAV/
commerce.asp [hereinafter RIVER COMMERCE]. Today, the Port of New Orleans is the “number one
port in the United States.” Id. 
located.  Although Hennepin boasted of being the first explorer to travel37
the length of the Mississippi, La Salle actually accomplished the task
first.  La Salle named the entire basin “Louisiana” in honor of King Louis38
XIV and claimed it for France in 1682.  These events had great39
significance for both the Mississippi and Missouri River basins. France’s
claim to the lands west of the Mississippi River and its hold on the Port of
New Orleans—an essential port for international trade—eventually led to
President Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase in 1803 and the exploration of
the Missouri River by Captain Meriwether Lewis and Lieutenant William
Clark in 1804.40
Lewis and Clark were sent up the Missouri River in hopes of
discovering an all-water route to the Northwest that would tie the young
nation together from east to west.  These dreams were dashed, however,41
when the expedition encountered the formidable Rocky Mountains and
realized that an all-water route simply did not exist.  Although Jefferson’s42
navigational aspirations were not fulfilled, the Corps of Discovery brought
back a wealth of scientific information and made unparalleled zoological
and botanical discoveries.  43
Meanwhile, the Americans, much as the French had before them,
exerted heroic efforts to tame the Mississippi River to serve the nation’s
navigational ends. The first steamboat to ply the waters of the Mississippi,
the New Orleans, arrived in the city of New Orleans in 1812.  The44
Mississippi soon became the major artery for military supplies, oil, and
grain.  In the 1820s, at the direction of Congress, the Corps of Engineers45
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46. MISS. VALLEY DIV., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, MISSISSIPPI RIVER NAVIGATION:
FEDERAL PARTICIPATION IN WATERWAYS DEVELOPMENT (1985), available at
http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/PAO/history/MISSRNAV/federal.asp [hereinafter FEDERAL
PARTICIPATION].
47. Id. This report was considered “a great step forward in the development of river
engineering in the United States.” Id. 
48. See JOHN M. BARRY, RISING TIDE: THE GREAT MISSISSIPPI FLOOD OF 1927 AND HOW IT
CHANGED AMERICA 90 (1997); FEDERAL PARTICIPATION, supra note 46.
49. See Diane M. Grassi, Levees Not to Blame for Response Management Failures, AM.
CHRON., Sept. 7, 2005, http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/ viewArticle.asp?articleID=
2281.
50. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LITERATURE, supra note 35, at 681.
51. Michael C. Robinson, Mobilizing the Waterways: The Mississippi River Navigation
System, in BUILDERS AND FIGHTERS: U.S. ARMY ENGINEERS IN WORLD WAR II 259, 262 (Bary W.
Fowle ed., 1992), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/publications/eng-pamphlets/ep870-1-
42/c-4-4.pdf.
52. FEDERAL PARTICIPATION, supra note 46.
53. U.S. Geological Survey, Upper Midwest Environmental Sciences Center, About the
Upper Mississippi River System, http://www.umesc.usgs.gov/umesc_about/about_umrs.html (last
visited Feb. 17, 2007).
54. RIVER COMMERCE, supra note 45; see Robinson, supra note 51, at 265.
55. Press Release, Univ. of Del. Graduate Coll. of Marine Studies & Sea Grant Program, UD
conducted a thorough investigation of the navigational capabilities and
physical characteristics of the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers. Legislation
was subsequently passed requiring the “removal of snags and other
obstructions from the channels of the rivers.”  In 1861, Captain A. A.46
Humphreys and Henry Abbott addressed both navigation and flood control
in their now-famous “Report Upon the Physics and Hydraulics of the
Mississippi River; Upon the Protection of the Alluvial Region Against
Overflow; and Upon the Deepening of the Mouths.”  This report dictated47
the Corps’ “levees-only policy” of navigation and flood control and
continues to influence modern-day river management.48
By 1880, miles of levees had been constructed on the Mississippi
River, and the Corps conducted dredging operations with a vengeance to
keep the channel clear of sediment and debris.  Shortly after the Civil49
War, however, “competition from railroads had made steamboats passé.”50
By World War I, commercial use of the Mississippi’s navigational systems
came to a standstill.  Undeterred from the dream of promoting Mississippi51
River navigation, Congress authorized construction of a nine-foot-deep
channel and multiple locks and dams.  These structures replaced the52
Mississippi’s rapids and falls with a highly regulated “stairway of water”
to allow greater commercial traffic.  A resurgence in inland river53
transportation occurred during World War II as fuel and military vessels
moved from inland ports to the Gulf.  Today, nearly 500 million tons of54
cargo move through Mississippi River ports in Louisiana and Mississippi
annually.  To support these endeavors, the “delta below the City of New55
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Marine Transportation Experts Analyze Hurricane Katrina’s Effects on U.S. Shipping (Sept. 7,
2005), http://www.ocean.udel.edu/newscenter/ HurricaneKatrina.html (citing NAVIGATION DATA
CTR., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, ANNUAL CARGO SUMMARY—SHORT TONS CARGO PER YEAR
(2003)). Together, the Ports of New Orleans, South Louisiana, and Baton Rouge move between ten
to fifteen percent of all U.S. waterborne cargo annually. See id.; VANESSA CIESLAK, PORTS IN
LOUISIANA: NEW ORLEANS, SOUTH LOUISIANA, AND BATON ROUGE 2 (2005), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/57872.pdf.
56. Oliver Houck, Can We Save New Orleans?, 19 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 9 (2006); see also
JOHN MCPHEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURE 36-37 (1989) (describing the development of the
Mississippi River floodplains).
57. David Getches, Water Wrongs: Why Can’t We Get It Right the First Time?, 34 ENVTL.
L. 1, 8 (2004).
58. See BILL LAMBRECHT, BIG MUDDY BLUES: TRUE TALES AND TWISTED POLITICS ALONG
LEWIS AND CLARK’S MISSOURI RIVER 64-67 (2005).
59. See Michael Grunwald, Washed Away: Bush v. the Missouri River, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct.
27, 2003, at 16, 17, available at https://ssi.tnr.com/p/docsub.mhtml?i=20031027&s=grunwald
102703.
60. See id.
61. See John H. Davidson,“Sound Science” on the Missouri River—How It Should Influence
Law and Policy (Feb. 4, 2004), http://southdakota.sierraclub.org/livingriver/mripaper.htm;
Mississippi River Basin & Gulf of Mexico Hypoxia Channelization,
http://www.epa.gov/msbasin/subbasins/challenges/navigation.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
62. See WATER SCI. & TECH. BD., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE MISSOURI RIVER
ECOSYSTEM: EXPLORING THE PROSPECTS FOR RECOVERY 22, 56 (2002), available at
http://books.nap.edu/catalog/10277.html.
Orleans alone is cut by more than a dozen commercial
waterways . . . totaling more than 300 miles.”  The Corps relies on levees56
to thwart the river’s natural tendency to shift its flow and find a “more
direct and less resistant course to the Gulf.”57
In spite of equally extensive efforts to thwart nature’s will, navigational
aspirations for the Missouri River never materialized. The Missouri is
notorious for its unpredictable channels, crumbling banks, and hidden
snags that can sink a boat in the blink of an eye.  Today, only a handful58
of barge operators conduct business between St. Louis, Missouri and Sioux
City, Iowa.  They carry a miniscule amount of the grain exported from59
riparian states, and commentators have quipped that it would be cheaper
for farmers to ship via Federal Express.60
Besides being an expensive and never-ending commitment,
navigational enhancement and flood prevention are ecological
disturbances for rivers like the Mississippi and the Missouri, both of which
rely on periodic flooding to provide connectivity between channel and
floodplain.  The natural hydrograph of the meandering, braided Missouri61
River is marked by spring and early summer rises from precipitation on the
Plains and snowmelt in the Rockies, followed by a late summer decline in
flow.  Prior to the mid-1950s, periodic and occasionally extreme flooding62
kept the connections between the main channel, its tributaries, and its
608 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59
63. See id. at 2.
64. Davidson, supra note 61.
65. For a more extensive discussion, see Zellmer, supra note 15, at 312-19.
66. See WATER SCI. & TECH. BD., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 62, at 3. Of the
sixty-seven native fish species in the mainstream river, fifty-one are vulnerable in all or part of their
historical range. Id. 
67. See MISS. VALLEY DIV., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, MISSISSIPPI RIVER NAVIGATION,
available at http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/PAO/BRO/Navigation.pdf; U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, The Mississippi River and Tributaries Project, www.mvn.usace.army.mil/pao/bro/miss
trib.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2007); see also Nat’l Research Council, Ocean Studies Board, Drawing
Louisiana’s New Map: Addressing Land Loss in Coastal Louisiana 36 (2006), available at
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record id=11476&page=36.
68. See BARRY, supra note 48, at 89-91; ROBERT KELLEY SCHNEIDERS, UNRULY RIVER: TWO
CENTURIES OF CHANGE ALONG THE MISSOURI 222-51 (1999).
69. See BARRY, supra note 48, at 13-17.
70. See LAMBRECHT, supra note 58, at 72-73 (describing the Great Flood of 1943);
SCHNEIDERS, supra note 68, at 187-98 (describing the Great Flood of 1952).
71. Beth Davidson, Note, How Quickly We Forget: The National Flood Insurance Program
and Floodplain Development in Missouri, 19 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 365, 367 (2005).
72. Id. at 365.
broad floodplain alive.  Since then, the Corps’ activities have eliminated63
ninety percent of the Missouri sandbars and eighty percent of its aquatic
food sources.  The Corps has also eliminated the fecund wetlands along64
the river corridor, which, prior to dikes, levees, and bank stabilizations,
had been recharged with each flood pulse.  More than sixty native species65
are listed by state and federal authorities as endangered or threatened,
primarily as a result of riparian habitat destruction.66
The Mississippi River has been heavily altered as well. Levees encase
more than eighty percent of the lower river, and the floodplain between St.
Louis and the Gulf is armored by levees that form a veritable straitjacket.67
In spite of humankind’s best engineering efforts, the Mississippi, like the
Missouri, occasionally flexes its muscles and escapes its banks, gobbling
up everything in its path.  Sometimes it takes a hurricane to provoke this68
behavior; sometimes, as in 1927, it just takes rain.
The Great Mississippi Flood of 1927, a product of sustained rainfall in
the Mississippi Basin, brought international attention to the lower
Mississippi when it washed away entire cities and caused billions of
dollars of economic damages.  In the 1940s and early 1950s, several69
floods on the Missouri River devastated surrounding communities situated
in the river’s floodplain.  In 1965, Hurricane Betsy inundated the Gulf70
Coast.  In 1993, the upper Mississippi and its tributaries flooded 17,00071
square miles, killing fifty people, damaging 70,000 buildings, and causing
economic damages exceeding $12 billion.  After the 1993 flood, a “blue72
ribbon” interagency committee headed by former Army Brigadier General
Gerald Galloway recommended a shift in floodplain management away
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73. See INTERAGENCY FLOODPLAIN MGMT. REVIEW COMM., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, SHARING THE CHALLENGE: FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT INTO THE 21ST CENTURY 5-7
(1994).
74. Scott Faber, Flood Policy and Management: A Post-Galloway Progress Report, RIVER
VOICES, Summer 1997, at 1, 7, available at http://www2.rivernetwork.org/library/rv1997v8n2.pdf;
cf. Thomas A. Birkland et al., River Ecology and Flood Hazard Mitigation, NAT. HAZARDS REV.,
Feb. 2003, at 46, 46 (concluding that continuing policies favoring structural mitigation “fail to
protect lives and property while also contributing to the degradation of the riverine environment”);
Jan Sendzimir et al., Adaptive Understanding and Management for Floods, at 15,
http://www.adaptivemanagement.net/Flooding.doc (describing an exceptional post-flood systems
approach in Minnesota where “flood-damage reduction and restoration of ecosystem services are
being given separate but equal consideration”).
75. See Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, NEWS HIGHLIGHTS (Nat’l Climatic Data Ctr.,
Asheville, N.C.), Fall 2005, at 1, 1, available at http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/about/NOAA
Newsletter4.pdf (describing Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita, which followed closely on
Katrina’s heels, as part of the most volatile Atlantic hurricane season on record).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Spencer S. Hsu, Waste in Katrina Response Is Cited; Housing Aid Called Inefficient
in Audits, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 2006, at A01; Death Toll from Katrina Likely Higher than 1,300,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 10, 2006, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11281267/; Nat’l
Cl imatic  Data  Ctr . ,  B i l l ion Dollar  U.S.  Weather  Disaster s ,  h t tp : / /
www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/reports/billionz.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2006) (characterizing Katrina
as “the most expensive natural disaster in U.S. history”).
79. Ted Rekerdres, Insurance Industry Addresses Katrina Losses, TEA & COFFEE TRADE J.,
Jan. 20, 2006, at 48, 48.
80. Peter Whoriskey & Spencer S. Hsu, Wait Ends on Rules for Katrina Rebuilding; $2.5
Billion More for Levees Also Proposed, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2006, at A01.
from levees to non-structural responses, such as wetland restoration.73
Although his recommendations were widely applauded, they have been
largely ignored in practice.74
For most readers today, the disastrous socio-economic impacts of the
nation’s failed flood-control policies were vividly illustrated by the losses
of human life and property stemming from Hurricane Katrina in the fall of
2005.  By August 31, 2005, eighty percent of New Orleans was under75
water as a result of the failure of levees designed to hold back Lake
Pontchartrain.  The levees gave way under the combination of heavy76
rainfall, strong winds, and storm surges,  resulting in 1,300 deaths, more77
than $100 billion in property damage, and the nation's largest housing
crisis since World War II.  According to the insurance industry, as of78
January 2006, total economic losses attributed to Hurricane Katrina were
thirty percent higher than economic losses due to the destruction of the
World Trade Center on September 11, 2001.  In early 2006, federal79
officials announced that reconstructing the levees would cost
approximately $10 billion.80
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81. See Houck, supra note 56, at 56.
82. Id. at 42.
83. WATER SC. & TECH. BD., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 62, at 2.
84. See John H. Davidson, Multiple-Use Water Resources Development Versus Natural River
Functions: Can the WSRA and WRDA Coexist on the Missouri River?, 83 NEB. L. REV. 362, 366
(2004) (citing U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON THE OPERATION AND
MAINTENANCE OF THE MISSOURI RIVER MAIN STEM RESERVOIR SYSTEM, OPERATION AND
MAINTENANCE OF THE MISSOURI RIVER BANK STABILIZATION AND NAVIGATION PROJECT, AND
OPERATION OF THE KANSAS RIVER RESERVOIR SYSTEM 120 (2000)); WATER SC. & TECH. BD.,
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 62, at 123; U.S. Geological Survey, Upper Midwest
Environmental Sciences Center, supra note 53 (explaining that today’s sedimentation patterns,
altered by the construction of locks and dams on the river, have caused severe ecological
degradation).
85. See Houck, supra note 56, at 35.
86. See CHRISTOPHER HALLOWELL, HOLDING BACK THE SEA: THE STRUGGLE FOR AMERICA’S
NATURAL LEGACY ON THE GULF COAST 11-38 (2001) (describing coastal development and the loss
of coastal marshlands and communities); Houck, supra note 56, at 35 (citing LA. COASTAL
WETLANDS CONSERVATION & RESTORATION TASK FORCE & WETLANDS CONSERVATION &
RESTORATION AUTH., COAST 2050: TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE COASTAL LOUISIANA 551 (1998)).
Levee expenditures might provide a short-term solution to the
immediate needs of coastal residents, but levee reconstruction
accomplishes nothing for the overall well-being of the Mississippi River
basin. Fertilizers and polluted run-off from crop production and animal-
feeding operations in the floodplains of the Missouri and the upper
Mississippi dump into the rivers, rush down the Mississippi, and shoot out
into the Gulf. The deep, fast navigational channel and levees aid and abet
this process.  Oyster beds, commercial fisheries, and interior marshes are81
being choked to death by nutrients, and the Gulf at the mouth of the
Mississippi is a “‘dead zone’ of oxygen-starved water that is larger than
the state of Delaware.”82
Ironically, the Mississippi Delta needs the upper basin’s sediments.
Prior to the construction of dams and reservoirs, the Missouri River carried
approximately 140 million tons of sediment per year downstream past
Sioux City, Iowa, but in the post-dam era, this has been reduced to about
four million tons per year.  Soils more slowly transported and delivered83
at the proper time, place, and manner and filtered through oxbows and
riparian wetlands could eventually replenish the coastal marshes of the
Delta and provide essential nesting and spawning habitats for local
imperiled fish and bird species.  Coastal marshes serve as “horizontal84
levees” that both nurture the Gulf’s legendary seafood industry and absorb
storm surges,  but these natural levees are rapidly disappearing. Since the85
1980s, losses to development, navigation, and flood-control devices, as
well as oil and gas canals, average twenty to twenty-five square miles per
year.  Before Hurricane Katrina hit, between New Orleans and the Gulf,86
there were still about eighty miles of marsh that provided at least a six-foot
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87. See Houck, supra note 56, at 35.
88. See Press Release, U.S. Geological Survey, Nat’l Wetlands Research Ctr., USGS Reports
Latest Land Change Estimates for Louisiana Coast (Oct. 3, 2006), available at
http://www.nwrc.usgs.gov/releases/pr06_002.htm. The 2005 hurricane season converted 217 square
miles of Louisiana’s marshland into open water. Id. In comparison, Louisiana lost 1,900 total
square miles of coastal lands between 1932 and 2000. Id. 
89. See Tarlock, supra note 24, at 1315-16.
90. See Houck, supra note 56, at 51-52 (describing the ineffectiveness of levees).
91. Id. at 52; see Davidson, supra note 61.
92. Houck, supra note 56, at 55. Nineteenth-century engineer James Eads boasted that
every atom that moves onward in the river . . . is controlled by [engineering] laws
as fixed and certain as those which direct the majestic march of the heavenly
spheres. . . . [T]he engineer needs only to be assured that he does not ignore the
existence of any of these laws, to feel positively certain of the result he aims at.
BARRY, supra note 48, at 77.
93. See Houck, supra note 56, at 55.
94. Id. For an in-depth look at the role of science in endangered species protection, see Holly
Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future of the Endangered Species Act’s Best Available
Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397, 408-11 (2004).
reduction in storm surge.  Far less remains today.  But navigation and87 88
floodplain development are still top priorities on both river systems,
requiring deep channels, bank stabilization, and vertical, manmade levees.
III.  STASIS, ISOLATION, AND COLLAPSE
Is it possible for long-standing societal goals for these managed rivers
to evolve? For evolve they must, if we care about restoring and sustaining
resilient human and ecological communities. The horrific damages
wrought by Hurricane Katrina provide a powerful stimulus to alter our
river-management priorities.
Ever since the earliest days of our nation, undue confidence has been
placed in the “rational” disciplines of engineering and economics to solve
our water-resource problems.  The apparent objectivity of these two fields89
lulls our decisionmakers into complacency with the happy delusion that
hard choices about whether and where to develop need not be made; after
all, it is just a matter of doing things smarter.90
For years, the only science brought to bear on the Missouri and
Mississippi Rivers has been that of civil engineering.  One nice thing91
about engineering is that it appears to be so certain.  Engineering reflects92
the laws of mathematics and physics;  as such, engineering solutions are93
tangible and concrete—literally and figuratively. In contrast, under the
scientific method utilized in ecology, biology, and other earth sciences, a
thesis may stand only until subsequent revelations push it aside.94
Uncertainty is the name of the game. In the hurly-burly of river
612 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59
95. Sandra Zellmer, A Preservation Paradox: Political Prestidigitation and an Enduring
Resource of Wildness, 34 ENVTL. L. 1015, 1028 (2004).
96. See Corps of Engineers Overview, supra note 18.
97. See Martin Reuss & Charles Hendricks, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: Brief History,
http://www.usace.army.mil/history/brief.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2007). Its authorities were
expanded by subsequent enactments and Executive Order. See WATER SCI. & TECH. BD., NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, NEW DIRECTIONS IN WATER RESOURCES PLANNING FOR THE U.S. ARMY
CORPS OF ENGINEERS, 10-17 (1999), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/6128.html.
98. See Reuss & Hendricks, supra note 97.
99. Act of Mar. 16, 1802, ch. 9, §§ 26-28, 2 Stat. 132, 137.
100. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-418 (2000).
101. Id. §§ 401, 403, 407; see United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 229-30 (1966)
(finding that gasoline discharged through a valve into the St. Johns River came within the Act’s ban
on the deposit of “refuse matter”); United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 483-85
(1960) (enjoining companies from placing industrial deposits in the Calumet River, a tributary of
the Mississippi, because the deposits reduced the depth of the channel of the river and created an
obstruction).
102. See Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: National Interests vs. State Authority
Under Federal Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 241, 242. However, there are good
management, this means that ecologists and biologists, charged with
protecting migratory birds, endangered species, and ecological functions,
fall by the wayside. For decisionmakers, uncertainty is an impediment to
credibility, to finality, and to funds for the home district. But uncertainty
can also be used as a shield for the decisionmaker who wishes to preserve
the status quo by doing nothing.95
Reliance on engineering is deeply embedded in federal water
management because it is deeply embedded in the mindset of the Corps of
Engineers. The Corps was the first federal agency to involve itself in water
affairs.  It traces its lineage back to 1775, when the Continental Congress96
appointed a Chief of Engineers of the Continental Army under General
George Washington.  The original Corps served as the military’s97
engineering and construction arm until the end of the Revolutionary War
in 1783.  Congress reestablished the Corps within the U.S. Army in98
1802.99
The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 was one of the earliest explicit
congressional expressions of strong federal powers over an array of
activities connected with navigable waters.  It gives the Corps broad100
authority to prevent obstructions to navigation and to promote the federal
navigational servitude, including transportation improvement and flood
control efforts on mainstems and tributaries of navigable waters.  Other101
than constructing navigational enhancements and clearing navigational
impediments, the federal government took little or no responsibility for
water or water-dependent resources until the New Deal. Additionally, it
routinely proclaimed its deference to the states when it came to water-
resources management.102
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reasons to question “the conventional wisdom of federal deference to States in water resource
matters.” Id. at 243 (citing Amy K. Kelley, Staging a Comeback: Section 8 of the Reclamation Act,
18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 97, 117 n.98 (1984)); David H. Getches, The Metamorphosis of Western
Water Policy: Have Federal Laws and Local Decisions Eclipsed the States’ Role?, 20 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 3, 6 (2001).
103. See BARRY, supra note 48, at 375.
104. See id. at 374.
105. Flood Control Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 70-391, 45 Stat. 534 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 702
(2000)); see also BARRY, supra note 48, at 375.
106. BARRY, supra note 48, at 407.
107. See John A. Lovett, Batture, Ordinary High Water, and the Louisiana Levee Servitude,
69 TUL. L. REV. 561, 562 & n.2 (1994); Richard P. Wolfe, The Appropriation of Property for
Levees: A Louisiana Study in Taking Without Just Compensation, 40 TUL. L. REV. 233, 236-38
(1966).
108. See, e.g., Flood Control Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-738, 49 Stat. 1570 (codified at 33
U.S.C. § 701(a) (2000)); Flood Control Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-534, 58 Stat. 887 (codified at
33 U.S.C. § 701-1 (2000)); Flood Control Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-298, 79 Stat. 1073.
109. See, e.g., Water Resources Development Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-662, 100 Stat. 4082
(codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000)); Water Resources Development Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-640, 104 Stat. 4604 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000)); Water Resources Development Act
of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-541, 114 Stat. 2572 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000)).
110. See infra note 174 and accompanying text (describing “pork barrel” funding).
111. Southeast Hurricane Disaster Relief Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-339, 79 Stat. 1301
(allocating up to $70 million for disaster relief).
The Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 marked a watershed moment
when the fallacy of letting local governments and powerful individuals
take the lead for water-resources management—saving “Main Street with
Main Street,” as President Hoover once remarked—was laid bare.103
Citizens cried out for federal leadership, technology, and financial
resources to control floods and to remediate their devastating effects.104
The Flood Control Act of 1928 proclaimed that the federal government
would take full responsibility for the Mississippi River.  The Act105
established “a precedent of direct, comprehensive, and vastly expanded
federal involvement in local affairs [and] a major shift in what Americans
considered the proper role and obligation of the national government.”106
Existing local levee districts, however, were left with the lion’s share of
responsibility for maintaining floodwalls and pumps in New Orleans.107
Congress enacted a series of Flood Control Acts between 1928 and
1965.  Along with these Acts, appropriations for specified navigational108
enhancements, dams, levees, and other engineering structures have been
provided through the years in various Water Resources Development
Acts.  Many of these projects are “earmarks,” cherry-picked and109
championed by individual congressional members to benefit their home
districts.  Hurricane Betsy, a catastrophic hurricane in 1965, resulted in110
one such enactment.111
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112. DONALD T. HORNSTEIN ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, BROKEN LEVEES: WHY
THEY FAILED 3 (2005) (citing Hurricane Protection Plan for Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources of the H. Comm. on Public Works and
Transportation, 95th Cong. 20 (1978)), available at http://www.Progressivereform.org/articles/
CPR_special_Levee_Report.pdf.
113. Hurricane Protection—Statutory and Regulatory Framework for Levee Maintenance and
Emergency Response for the Lake Pontchartrain Project: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 3 (2005) (statement of Anu K. Mittal,
Director, Natural Resources & Environment, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06322t.pdf.
114. Id. at 3.
115. HORNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 112, at 5 (quoting U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
IMPROVED PLANNING NEEDED BY THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS TO RESOLVE ENVIRONMENTAL,
TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL ISSUES ON THE LAKE PONTCHARTRAIN HURRICANE PROTECTION
PROJECT 2 (1982), available at http://archive.gao.gov/d42t14/119206.pdf). Within days of
Hurricane Katrina, pundits claimed that environmentalists’ litigation had prevented the
implementation of the barrier plan. Id. at 1. The case in question, Save Our Wetlands v. Rush, No.
75-3710, slip op. (E.D. La. Dec. 30, 1977), established that the environmental impact statement
(EIS) for the Corps’ proposal was inadequate under the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000), due to reliance on obsolete studies. HORNSTEIN ET AL.,
supra note 112, at 10-11. An injunction was issued against the Corps, but levee construction was
allowed to continue. Id. at 11. The Corps subsequently reevaluated its options and chose the levee
project. Id. at 12.
116. 33 U.S.C. § 701a (2000).
117. See id.
118. See id.
In Betsy’s wake, Congress authorized the Lake Pontchartrain and
Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project, a massive system of levees intended
to protect New Orleans.  The authorization for the Lake Pontchartrain112
Project made the Corps responsible for design and construction, with the
federal government paying seventy percent of the cost and the state and
local entities covering the balance.  Under agreements between the Corps113
and the New Orleans levee districts, the local districts are responsible for
post-construction operation, maintenance, and repair of the levees.  The114
levee project was chosen over an alternate system of barriers because it
cost less and, according to the Corps, had “‘fewer detrimental effects on
Lake Pontchartrain’s environment.’”  In hindsight, this was a poor115
choice, but the die had been cast years before with the policies expressed
in the Flood Control Act of 1936 (FCA).116
The FCA is particularly notable because it explicitly recognized the
federal responsibility for flood-control measures nationwide.  It failed,117
however, to impose any significant parameters on the Corps’ selection and
construction of flood-control projects.  So long as the Corps is able to118
secure funding from its benefactors in Congress, the FCA affords it
unbridled discretion to conduct any project it chooses whenever “the
benefits to whomsoever they may accrue are in excess of the estimated
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119. Id. A 1944 amendment added a savings clause for state water law, proclaiming
congressional policy “to recognize the interests and rights of the States in determining the
development of the watersheds within their borders and likewise their interests and rights in water
utilization and control.” Id. § 701-1. This clause has been all but ignored by the courts. See infra
notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
120. Frank Ackerman et al., Applying Cost-Benefit to Past Decisions: Was Environmental
Protection Ever a Good Idea?, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 155, 155 (2005).
121. Christine A. Klein, On Dams and Democracy, 78 OR. L. REV. 641, 679 (1999).
122. Id. at 679-80; see also MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND
ITS DISAPPEARING WATER 171 (1986) (condemning the Corps’ uncompromising tactics in
promoting its projects and describing it “as opportunistic and ruthless an agency as American
government has ever seen”).
123. Tarlock, supra note 24, at 1315; see John H. Davidson & Thomas Earl Geu, The Missouri
River and Adaptive Management: Protecting Ecological Function and Legal Process, 80 NEB. L.
REV. 816, 859 (2001); Robert C. Lothrop, The Misplaced Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis in
Columbia Basin Fishery Mitigation, 16 ENVTL. L. 517, 534-38 (1986).
124. See Oliver Houck, Unfinished Stories, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 867, 939 (2002) (“In-depth
and documented reports of . . . cost-benefit manipulations, false reporting, employees terminated
for honesty, and humiliating servility to whatever Congress wants funded appear regularly in the
media . . . with little effect.”); Daniel McCool, The River Commons: A New Era in U.S. Water
Policy, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1903, 1906 (2005) (citing WATER SCI. & TECH. BD., NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, supra note 97, at 67-78).
125. Klein, supra note 121, at 680 (citing Bruce Upbin, A River of Subsidies, FORBES, Mar.
23, 1998, at 86, available at 1998 WLNR 8750995).
126. See McCool, supra note 124, at 1906-07, 1918-19.
costs.”119
On its face, this CBA directive may appear to provide a rational
decisionmaking metric. By requiring that the costs and benefits of a
proposed action be quantified and translated into dollar terms, CBA is said
to be a neutral, unbiased method of evaluating the social effects of a
proposal and exposing bad proposals that would impose ruinous social
costs.  It has not, however, accomplished this goal in the Corps’120
decisionmaking processes.
Since 1936, the Corps has spent billions of dollars on dams, reservoirs,
levees, and other structures for flood control and related purposes.  In121
spite of the FCA’s directive, the Corps has built numerous projects with
negative cost-benefit ratios.  According to Dan Tarlock, “The Corps has122
a long history of inflated and methodologically unsound benefit-cost
analysis techniques . . . .”  There are many examples of projects where123
the Corps overestimated the benefits and downplayed both the social and
ecological costs in order to justify construction.  The benefits of124
navigational enhancements on the Missouri to support commercial barge
traffic were exaggerated “almost tenfold.”  In 2002, the National125
Research Council issued an indictment of the inflated cost-benefit
methodology used by the Corps to justify replacing aging locks and dams
on the upper Mississippi.  Judicial intervention has rarely curbed the126
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127. See, e.g., Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989); Am. Rivers Inc.
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (In re Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig.), 421 F.3d 618 (8th Cir.
2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1879 (2006), 126 S. Ct. 1880 (2006), and 126 S. Ct. 1880 (2006);
see also Houck, supra note 124, at 939 (“Immune from the president and in large part from the
courts, . . . there is no reason, fiscal, environmental, or otherwise, that appears able to stop [the
Corps and the Bureau of Reclamation].” (footnote omitted)).
128. Michael Grunwald, Par for the Corps: A Flood of Bad Projects, WASH. POST, May 14,
2006, at B01.
129. Schleifstein, supra note 12, at 1.
130. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 557-61
(2000).
131. See Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything
and the Value of Nothing, SK058 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 571, 573, 588 (2005) (describing the U.S. EPA’s
experiences with arsenic and asbestos regulations); Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Our Future, 34
LAND & WATER L. REV. 39, 54-57 (1999) (describing use of discounting by federal agencies to
inflate predicted future benefits).
Corps’ activities; deference to the agency runs high, especially when it
comes to complex river–management issues.127
As for Hurricane Katrina, the Corps’ application of CBA likely
exacerbated the devastation of the Gulf Coast. As a result of the Corps’
failure to consider the cost of lost human lives and environmental
destruction, most of the Corps’ levees were situated to protect
undeveloped, highly vulnerable floodplains instead of existing
developments.  As commonly stated, hindsight is often 20/20. In128
considering alternatives for addressing future hurricanes in the Gulf, the
Corps now admits that its traditional approach to CBA is unlikely to
“‘justify risk reduction measures for storms having the surge
characteristics contemplated’ by Congress, in part because they ‘do not
consider such non-economic assets as human life.’”129
Of course, CBA is not uncommon among federal mandates; Executive
Orders currently require it for all major federal regulations.  And of130
course, the Corps is not the only federal agency that can be accused of
using CBA to inflate projected benefits and to minimize costs in order to
favor pro-development results.  The failures of CBA as used by the U.S.131
Environmental Protection Agency and other federal regulatory agencies
are well-documented.
Although the benefits of health and environmental protection
are vitally important, . . . the pecuniary value of the deaths
and diseases avoided by reducing pollution cannot be
meaningfully expressed in monetary terms. . . . The cost-
benefit calculation’s attempt to assign monetary values
distorts, misrepresents, and narrows the priceless values of
life, health, and nature, and belittles the widespread concern
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132. Ackerman et al., supra note 120, at 157 (footnote omitted).
133. Id.
134. See id. at 156.
135. Id. (describing three case studies—the extraction of lead from gasoline, the choice not
to dam the Grand Canyon for hydropower, and the regulation of exposure to vinyl chloride in the
workplace—where the application of CBA would have defeated regulations that are now
recognized as highly beneficial).
136. See id. at 192.
137. Christine A. Klein, On Integrity: Some Considerations for Water Law, 56 ALA. L. REV.
1009, 1058-59 (2005) (citing Wendy E. Wagner, Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy,
1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 181, 221); see also supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text (discussing
pitfalls of reliance on engineering solutions to water resource problems).
138. Benson, supra note 102, at 252-54.
for the well-being of future generations.132
In practice, the use of CBA, an “intricate process accessible only to
experts,”  often results in the rejection of sustainable, equitable133
policies.  Conversely, the most successful regulations enacted in this134
country “cleaned up the air and water, protected fragile ecosystems, and
achieved great gains in public health [] without reliance on cost-benefit
analysis, and clearly without destroying the economy.”  If lawmakers135
insisted on making all regulatory requirements meet CBA constraints, the
agencies charged with administering the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air
Act, and other progressive environmental statutes “would, in retrospect,
have gotten the wrong answer time after time.”136
Like excessive reliance on CBA, excessive reliance on engineering
technologies can also mask bad policy choices. Like CBA, the objective,
value-neutral language of engineering can cloak subjective, value-laden
outcomes with a façade of respectability, allowing decisionmakers to hide
behind “purportedly unquestionable . . . truths to avoid the political
consequences of a potentially unpopular decision.”  Placing undue faith137
in either CBA or engineering typically stems both from a failure to
appreciate the limits of these disciplines and from the desire to avoid
political ownership for uncertain or unpopular outcomes.
Just as zeal for the “rational” domains of CBA and engineering
technology should pose no serious impediment to the enactment of a
comprehensive, holistic federal strategy, neither should zeal for
federalism. The purported federal deference to state water law is not nearly
as strong as one might think. The Supreme Court has not hesitated to find
state law preempted when it interferes with federal navigational powers,
flood control, hydropower, or vessel safety.  Moreover, a polyphonic138
view of federalism—where federal, state, tribal, and local authorities are
appropriately matched with geographic and socio-economic issues in a
cooperative rather than exclusive fashion—should encourage, rather than
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139. See Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV.
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140. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499, 503-04 (1995).
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supra note 140, at 525-30.
142. PISANI, supra note 141, at 295.
143. See Getches, supra note 102, at 7-8.
144. Benson, supra note 102, at 243 (quoting Kelley, supra note 102, at 117).
145. See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2235 (2006).
146. Id.
147. See id. at 2214-15.
148. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000).
149. See id. § 1362.
obstruct, strong leadership in conservation policy.139
Federalism, defined generally as the extent to which state autonomy
limits the exercise of federal power, is intended to promote a decentralized
government that is more responsive to the needs of a diverse democratic
society by preventing “capture” by industry, increasing opportunities for
public involvement, and encouraging creativity and experimentation by
making states compete to satisfy a highly mobile citizenry.  American140
federalism can be seen as a firewall to safeguard the public from
dangerous, tyrannical impulses by allowing flexible, decentralized
institutions to flourish.  But by the same token, it can be seen as a141
wasteful, inefficient impediment to equitable, comprehensive planning.142
Water law demonstrates that neither of these viewpoints is entirely
accurate.
From the halls of Congress to the Town Hall and from the White House
to the State House, the allocation of power has been a ubiquitous theme in
the allocation of water rights, the protection of water quality and riparian
habitat, the conservation of wetlands, and the provision of water power
and flood control. Supreme Court jurisprudence on water-related matters
is replete with federalism rhetoric, but in fact, federal-state relations over
water are anything but consistent.  According to Professor Amy Kelley,143
“A more accurate description is that the field is a concoction of Byzantine
politics and legalistic archaeology.”144
In one of the most anxiously awaited decisions of the 2006 session, the
Supreme Court invoked federalism to strike a blow against wetlands
conservation.  The issue in Rapanos v. United States  was whether the145 146
Corps and the EPA could extend federal protection to small tributaries and
wetlands near, but not directly abutting, navigable waters.  The Clean147
Water Act covers all “waters of the United States,”  but Congress did not148
define that phrase.  The plurality by Justices Scalia, Roberts, Thomas,149
and Alito cleared the way for development of most wetlands and non-
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150. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2214, 2235.
151. Id. at 2222. Justice Kennedy concurred in the Court’s judgment but not in its reasoning.
Id. at 2236 (Kennedy, J., concurring). He recognized that non-perennial streams and wetlands may
be covered, but, to come within federal protection, he opined that regulators must make a
determination that the non-perennial streams and wetlands have a significant hydrological nexus
to a navigable water body. Id. at 2241 (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S.
121, 133 (1985)).
152. 531 U.S. 159, 173-74 (2001).
153. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2234.
154. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172; William Funk, The Court, the Clean Water Act, and the
Constitution: SWANCC and Beyond, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,741, 10,758 (2001).
155. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2224 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting SWANCC, 531
U.S. at 174).
156. Id. (citing BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544 (1994)).
157. Brief of the States of New York et al. as Amici Curiae in support of Respondents at 14,
Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006) (No. 04-1034), 2006 WL 139208.
perennial streams.  According to Scalia, to cover these waterways would150
stretch the Act’s coverage “beyond parody.”151
Federalism provides only a superficial explanation for this outcome. As
in a 2001 case, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (SWANCC),  Justice Scalia justified his limited view152
of Clean Water Act power by espousing a need to preserve “primary state
responsibility for ordinary land-use decisions.”  In SWANCC, the Court153
applied an interpretive canon to strike down the Corps’ so-called
“migratory bird” rule that asserted jurisdiction over isolated ponds:
“Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer
limits of Congress’ power, we expect a clear indication that Congress
intended that result.”  Justice Scalia continued with this rationale in154
Rapanos:
As we noted in SWANCC, the Government’s expansive
interpretation would “result in a significant impingement of
the States’ traditional and primary power over land and water
use. Regulation of land use, as through the issuance of the
development permits sought by petitioners in both of these
cases, is a quintessential state and local power.155
Justice Scalia further explained, “We ordinarily expect a ‘clear and
manifest’ statement from Congress to authorize an unprecedented intrusion
into traditional state authority. The phrase ‘the waters of the United States’
hardly qualifies.”  156
Ironically, in Rapanos, thirty-three states and the District of Columbia
filed friend-of-the-court briefs on behalf of the United States, seeking to
maintain broad federal power over wetlands and non-perennial streams.157
Apparently, a majority of the states believe that wetlands preservation is
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158. See Benson, supra note 102, at 294 (“[T]here is no universal policy of deference that
applies consistently across the many areas of federal law relating to water.”).
159. See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000); United States v. Alaska, 503
U.S. 569, 579-80 (1992); Ray v. Atl. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 165 (1978); Sinnot v. Davenport,
63 U.S. (1 How.) 227, 241 (1859); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 1, 72-74 (1824).
160. 484 U.S. 495 (1988).
161. See id. at 498, 511-12; see also Benson, supra note 102, at 297 n.393 (remarking that the
Corps’ programs for improvement of navigation, flood control, and hydropower “‘were never
subject to any form of state control’” (quoting FRANK J. TRELEASE, U.S. NAT’L WATER COMM’N,
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN WATER LAW 9-11 (1971))).
162. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
163. See id. at 131-32. As dissenting Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer pointed
out in SWANCC, to deny federal jurisdiction over isolated wetlands is unfaithful to Riverside
Bayview:
Contrary to the Court’s suggestion, the Corps’ interpretation of the statute does
not [infringe] upon [state control] over land use. “Land use planning in essence
chooses particular uses for the land; environmental regulation, at its core, does not
mandate particular uses of the land but requires only that, however the land is
used, damage to the environment is kept within prescribed limits.” The CWA is
not a land-use code; it is a paradigm of environmental regulation. Such regulation
is an accepted exercise of federal power.
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159,
191 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Ca. Coastal Comm’n v. Granite
Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 587 (1987)).
best accomplished by the federal government. Why, then, did the plurality
opinion reject the states’ reasoning? This is not about states’ rights; it is
about promoting development at the expense of at-risk human and
ecological communities. The invocation of federalism has promoted an
illusion of balance and accommodation, while in reality leaving federal,
state, and tribal governments to compete with each other for monetary and
political favor.
A closer look at Supreme Court jurisprudence shows that deference to
states in matters touching upon river and floodplain development is by no
means a foregone conclusion.  Particularly when it comes to federal158
navigational interests, there is no question that an inconsistent state law
gives way.  In ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri,  the Court barely gave159 160
a passing reference to South Dakota’s argument that a statutory savings
clause for state-sanctioned water rights empowered it to convey water
from a Corps’ flood control reservoir to a private interest.  Similarly, in161
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,  the Court prioritized the162
Clean Water Act’s goal of safeguarding the integrity of all U.S. waters,
including their adjacent wetlands, over any interest the state asserted in
land–use planning and development.  In several cases arising under the163
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164. 16 U.S.C. § 791a (2000).
165. See, e.g., California v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 495 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1990);
see also First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 328 U.S. 152, 177-82 (1946);
United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426 (1940) (rejecting the argument
that regulation of water projects within state boundaries rests with the State unless federal
regulation is directly related to navigation and remarking that “[f]lood protection, watershed
development, recovery of the cost of improvements through utilization of power are likewise parts
of [federal] commerce control”); Benson, supra note 102, at 295 (concluding that the Court reads
the Federal Power Act’s savings clause narrowly, in effect, “refusing any role for states that could
interfere with the broader purposes of the statute”).
166. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Union Elec. Co., 381 U.S. 90, 101 (1965). In California v. United
States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978), the Court distinguished the federal Reclamation Act of 1902, which
expressly requires the Bureau of Reclamation “to proceed in conformity with” state laws governing
use of water from federal reclamation projects. Id. at 674-75. The refusal to allow the Bureau to
adversely affect state-sanctioned private water rights is perhaps a lone exception to the general
pattern of strong federal control. See Benson, supra note 102, at 242-43 (noting that the Court has
issued its strongest proclamations of deference for state decisions regarding water rights in cases
addressing reclamation).
167. Benson, supra note 102, at 314 (emphasis added).
168. Id.
169. See Carrns, supra note 9; Sanders, supra note 10.
Federal Power Act,  the Court found that the Act preempted state164
minimum streamflow requirements that might negate the Act’s broad
purpose—to be a national regulatory scheme promoting full development
of the nation’s water resources.  The Court went on to explain that the165
federal purpose would be best served by comprehensive planning and the
consideration of impacts on “the full spectrum of commerce interests.”166
Even if one believes that the control of water resources is a traditional
state prerogative, it does not necessarily follow that states have some
special competence that justifies deference by the federal government;
indeed, “there seems to be no compelling argument that the states
inherently deserve deference in this area.”  Certainly, there may be167
instances where a state is best suited to make a particular decision—such
as restricting inter-basin diversion projects within the state—where
relevant factors turn on internal water supplies, local economic priorities,
present and future demands, and the cultural and ecological importance of
protecting the basin of origin.  But there is no justification for invoking168
a blanket rule of deference in all water-related cases. Local responses are
not adequate when it comes to interjurisdictional rivers threatened with
multiple transboundary threats. Hurricane Katrina drives this point home.
The levees failed at the weakest points, which were maintained by local
levee districts with little oversight or support from the Corps.169
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171. See supra note 109.
172. See ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 512 (1988); South Dakota v.
Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d 1014, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003).
173. BABBITT, supra note 14, at 52.
174. See McCool, supra note 124, at 1903, 1916 (noting the intransigence of “pork-barrel
politics and special-interest welfare” and identifying “political tradition, fueled by pork-barrel
politics and special interest welfare” as obstructions to progressive legislation); Tarlock, supra note
24, at 1316-17 (describing “pork barrel” politics of the Corps).
175. See Am. Rivers, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (In re Operation of Mo. River Sys.
Litig.) (Mo. River Sys. Litig.), 421 F.3d 618, 624-25 (8th Cir. 2005); Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d at 1021;
Am. Rivers v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 271 F. Supp. 2d 230, 251-52 (D.D.C. 2003). For the
etiology and outcomes of these cases, see Zellmer, supra note 15, at 324-33.
176. Zellmer, supra note 15, at 308.
177. Id.; see also LAMBRECHT, supra note 58, at 117-36 (describing the battle between birds,
barges, states, and federal agencies).
178. Zellmer, supra note 15, at 308; see also LAMBRECHT, supra note 58, at 287-305
(providing a behind-the-scenes look at Missouri River litigation).
179. See Mo. River Sys. Litig., 421 F.3d at 631 (“[T]he FCA . . . allows the Corps to decide
IV.  TIPPING POINTS
The various Flood Control Acts  and Water Resources Development170
Acts  passed between 1928 and today have been stacked one upon171
another by successive congressional sessions with little to no integration.
These statutes provide wide discretion to the Corps to conduct construction
in the name of just about anything, however loosely tied to navigation or
flood prevention.  Rather than following a rational, coordinated strategy,172
the Corps’ activities are governed by the “aggregate sum” of whatever
individual congressional members want.  Invariably, each member wants173
something that sends money and jobs to his or her own district.174
On both the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers, the law has failed to
address the needs of human and ecological communities. Concerning the
Missouri, upper basin states are pitted against lower basin states in the
courts, and both have had their run-ins with federal agencies. The Corps
stands at the center of the controversy, with the states, environmental
groups, and commercial associations demanding contradictory and even
mutually exclusive responses in river operations.  The stakes are high.175
Three federally–protected species hang in the balance, along with
recreational and commercial interests related to shipping, tourism, and
sport fisheries.  The impetus for the latest bout of litigation has been the176
Corps’ revision of its Master Manual for river operations under the Flood
Control Act of 1944.  Dozens of orders from numerous federal courts177
have ensued.  The sum of this effort is that the Corps has received the178
imprimatur to exercise its broad discretion to determine how best to fulfill
the “primary” navigational and flood control purposes of the FCA,
notwithstanding ecological imperatives.  In short, the Corps continues to179
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how best to support the primary interest of navigation in balance with other interests” and may
require the Corps to elevate navigation over endangered species).
180. See John P. Manard, Jr. et al., Katrina’s Tort Litigation: An Imperfect Storm, 20 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’T 31, 33-35 (2006).
181. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 1-2, 19, Blanco v. Burton, No.06-3813
(E.D. La. July 20, 2006), 2006 WL 2430359, available at http://www.gov.state.la.us/assets/docs/
PDFs/LS200Complaint.pdf (alleging violations of the NEPA, the Coastal Zone Management Act,
and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act).
182. Mitchell F. Crusto, The Katrina Fund: Repairing Breaches in Gulf Coast Insurance
Levees, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 329, 330-31 (2006).
183. See Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d 676, 691-93 (E.D. La.
2006) (dismissing negligence claims on grounds that defendants had no duty to these hundreds of
thousands of plaintiffs to protect them from the results of coastal erosion allegedly caused by
activities that were physically and proximately remote from plaintiffs and their property).
184. Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
185. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000).
186. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, La. Envtl. Action Network v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng’rs., No. 06-2020 (E.D. La. Apr. 18, 2006), 2006 WL 1267567. The court dismissed
their claims, finding that the Corps had the discretion to authorize the permit under its previously
issued “General Permit for Emergency Authorizations within the New Orleans District.” Patricia
E. Salkin, 2006 Update: Environmental Justice, SM004 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 929, 932 (2006). 
enjoy great latitude and uses it to maintain the status quo for the benefit of
entrenched, parochial interests rather than long-term ecological needs.
Concerning the Mississippi, post-Katrina litigation has blossomed.
Lawsuits have been filed against both the Corps and the local levee
districts for property damage and loss of life caused by the failed levee
system and pumps.  Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco has sued in180
federal court to prevent the United States from awarding mineral leases in
the Gulf, alleging that the federal government failed to properly analyze
and mitigate the adverse effects of oil and gas exploration to Louisiana’s
coastline in light of damage from Hurricane Katrina.  Homeowners have181
filed class action lawsuits against insurers for denying coverage for
damages resulting from the levee failures.  Residents of Orleans,182
Bernard, and Jefferson Parishes have sued various oil companies for
damages to coastal marshes caused by their canals and pipelines.  Last183
but not least, citizens’ groups have asserted Clean Water Act  and184
National Environmental Policy Act  claims against the Corps to prevent185
it from issuing an emergency permit to allow the dumping of hurricane-
related demolition debris near a minority community in New Orleans
East.186
Throughout these trials and travails, one dominant theme has
emerged—the failure to replace ill-suited and outdated human strategies
in favor of long-term ecosystem needs. When the Flood Control Acts were
adopted, navigational hopes were high and “ecosystem” was barely a
recognized concept among scientists, much less policy-makers. These Acts
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http://print.nap.edu/pdf/0309049482/pdf_image/78.pdf.
express a highly discretionary multiple-use requirement that gives the
Corps almost carte blanche authority to operate the rivers, with the
blessing of its most powerful congressional patrons. According to George
Cameron Coggins, this type of mandate is nothing but a “vacuous
platitude.”  Oliver Houck puts it even more bluntly, describing multiple187
use as “a code word for let’er rip and Katy-bar-the-door.”  The Corps is188
routinely given free rein to prioritize flood control and navigation while
merely considering recreation and fish and wildlife needs.189
This is not to say that the underlying objectives of the FCAs were way
off base at the time of enactment. Federal flood control efforts have served
laudable objectives by protecting vulnerable communities. But developing
the floodplain and armoring the river’s banks has spawned a vicious,
deadly cycle. Floods happen. Flood damage and losses to homes and
commercial enterprises follow. Disaster relief, typically comprised of
federal payments and more federal flood control projects, comes right on
the heels of the flood. Next come renewed encroachment and development
in the floodplain, now seen as safely behind the new flood control projects.
Then comes another flood, and the cycle repeats itself.190
Hurricane Katrina provides a wake-up call and a call to action.
According to former Secretary of Interior Bruce Babbitt, law, like a river
engaged in avulsion, will occasionally make “a clean break, abandoning
the old channel to create a new course.”191
Crisis can open windows of opportunity and spawn long-lasting
solutions that transcend immediate pressures and political maneuvering.
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198. WATER SCI. & TECH. BD., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 62, at 83-85.
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The smoldering Cuyahoga River in Ohio provided momentum for the
enactment of the federal Clean Water Act of 1972.  The discovery of192
toxic wastes seeping into people’s basements and schoolyards at Love
Canal prompted the passage of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) in 1980.  The193
highly publicized release of deadly chemicals from a Union Carbide
facility in Bhopal, India led to the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act of 1986.  The 1989 wreck of the Exxon-Valdez broke194
the long-running impasse over the federal Oil Pollution Act, enacted in
1990.195
V.  ADAPTATION AND RESILIENCE:  AN INTERIOR RIVERS
ECOSYSTEM ACT
The first step toward crafting and eventually enacting an Interior Rivers
Ecosystem Act is to define the end goal. This is not terribly difficult.
Sustaining the natural functioning and resilience of the river systems for
the human and ecological communities that rely on them must be the
overarching objective. Tailoring our actions to achieve that goal will be the
true challenge.
On the Missouri, the Endangered Species Act  provided the196
motivation to bring the science of ecology to the table and to develop a
conservation plan.  The earth sciences came to a consensus: Restore and197
maintain ecological and human communities by restoring a semblance of
the natural flow regime.  The Corps, however, resisted this move, as did198
its downstream allies who insist on maintaining lower basin flows and the
minimal commercial barge traffic below Omaha.199
If the rivers were to be managed to replicate the natural flow regime,
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navigation will be reduced. No commercial movement on the Missouri
River is possible below 30,000 cubic feet per second, which means there
will be no barges on some stretches of the rivers in late summer.  Yet, on200
the Missouri alone, the Corps itself acknowledged that the $2-3 million
loss in navigational benefits would be more than offset by increases in
ecosystem services.  The National Research Council estimated that201
recreational enhancement and other tangible, easily monetized benefits of
a restored flow regime would amount to more than $9 million a year, not
to mention the value of other, less readily monetized long-term ecosystem
benefits.  Highlighting the hydrological connection between the Missouri202
and Mississippi Rivers, the Council also noted that restored flows on the
Missouri could enhance ecosystem services such as soil fertility and
sediment transport throughout the system, assisting in the restoration of the
Delta.203
This is an appropriate juncture to acknowledge that there may be a
subsidiary role for CBA in the Corps’ activities, but CBA must be directed
and applied in a candid manner that acknowledges uncertainties and
accurately reflects the full range of social and ecological costs as well as
values provided by an intact, flowing river system. A strong cautionary
note is in order. Even where Congress has attempted to temper the
application of CBA with environmental considerations, the power and
persuasiveness of conventional CBA has won the day. Since 1990, the
Corps has been required to “include environmental protection as one of
[its] primary missions,”  but this hopelessly vague directive has been204
unenforceable in court.  Even where Congress has explicitly prioritized205
ecological needs over economic gains, success is not inevitable. By way
of example, the Northwest Power Act  directs the Northwest Power206
Planning Council to favor biological outcomes over economics.  Only207
when recovery measures are equally effective in satisfying biological goals
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(admonishing the Council that “a fish and wildlife measure cannot be rejected solely because it will
result in power losses and economic costs”).
212. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 223.102, 224.101 (2006) (listing threatened and endangered
anadromous species, respectively). See generally Richard O. Zerbe Jr. & Linda J. Graham, The
Role of Rights in Benefit Cost Methodology: The Example of Salmon and Hydroelectric Dams, 74
WASH. L. REV. 763, 765 (1999) (arguing that a refined CBA that better reflects both legal rights
and psychological expectations will be key to understanding trade-offs and making informed
decisions in the course of protecting threatened salmon species).
213. For citations to statutes granting authority to the Corps, see supra notes 100-01, 108-09.
In a previous article on Missouri River Management, I sounded the call for a Missouri River
Organic Act. Zellmer, supra note 15, at 346-57. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, it has become
clear that we need to reach farther and include the entire Missouri-Mississippi River basin.
214. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 220 (1985); Robert
L. Fischman, The National Wildlife Refuge System and the Hallmarks of Modern Organic
Legislation, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 457, 502-13 (2002).
do the relative costs of alternative measures become relevant.  The Act208
also lowers the burden of proof by requiring that fish recovery programs
“be based only on ‘best available scientific knowledge,’ not scientific
certainty.”  These provisions sound ideal in theory, but according to the209
Ninth Circuit, the Act has not lived up to its promise.  The reason is that210
the federal agencies in charge of operating dams along the Columbia
River, one of which happens to be the Corps, “insist upon judging the
justifiability of remedial efforts by cost-benefit analysis.”  Meanwhile,211
ever more salmon and steelhead species are being listed as endangered or
threatened.212
The question remaining for our federal legislators is how to adapt the
law to respond to the lessons of Hurricane Katrina in a fashion that both
places power and responsibility at appropriate levels of government and
synthesizes governmental conduct in areas of overlapping authority. The
answer will surely require replacing the current hodgepodge of highly
discretionary Flood Control Acts coupled with piecemeal funding of
favored projects through Water Resource Development Acts with a
holistic, organic act for the entire basin—an Interior Rivers Ecosystem
Act.  Programmatic enactments that create or empower administrative213
agencies and specify their overarching mission are generally known as
organic acts.  The organic act called for here would serve as a charter for214
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215. See Zellmer, supra note 15, at 346; see also Fischman, supra note 214, at 510-13
(describing five “hallmarks” of organic legislation).
216. See Fischman, supra note 214, at 510.
217. JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 799-800 (4th ed. 2006).
218. See Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water Management
in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405, 406 (2006) (citing GREAT LAKES-ST.
LAWRENCE RIVER BASIN WATER RESOURCES COMPACT (Dec. 13, 2005), available at
http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/12-13-05/Great_Lakes-St_ Lawrence_River_Basin_
Water_Resources_Compact.pdf); Council of Great Lake Governors, Great Lakes Water
Management Initiative, http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/index.asp (last visited Feb. 19, 2007).
219. Hall, supra note 218, at 435.
220. Id. at 405, 411.
221. See Bruce Babbitt, supra note 191 (noting that “Aldo Leopold once wrote that to
understand a landscape, it is necessary to ‘Think like a mountain’; we must now pause to ‘think like
a river’”).
222. Houck, supra note 56, at 61. For example, the Feingold-McCain Water Resources
the Corps and the lands and resources it administers by providing an
overarching mission statement, supported by clearly–delineated designated
uses and substantive management criteria, along with comprehensive
planning requirements and measures that ensure public participation and
accountability.  Together, these provisions would weave an otherwise215
disparate collection of federal management mandates into a system that is
far greater than the sum of its parts.216
Comprehensive, integrated management strategies for major
interjurisdictional river systems have been accomplished in other basins,
by legislation or interstate compacts. For example, on the Colorado River,
the “Law of the River” governs the activities of the federal agencies that
manage it and the seven states and numerous Indian tribes that draw their
lifeblood from it.  Similarly, in the Great Lakes, a multi-faceted interstate217
agreement that has been approved by eight state governors and two
Canadian Premiers is currently under consideration for ratification as an
interstate compact.  Under the proposed compact, the states and218
bordering Canadian provinces would cooperatively manage the Great
Lakes and their tributary surface and ground waters under common
standards.  These standards would be incorporated into state law and,219
once approved by Congress, enforceable as a matter of federal law.220
Key components of a comprehensive, organic Interior Rivers
Ecosystem Act should adhere to the following principles:
(1) Think like a river:  Adopt adaptive,2 2 1
ecologically–resilient management objectives; 
(2) Live within our means: Prioritize measures that promote
resilience and sustainability, rather than measures that
may seem economically desirable for the short term but
are unsustainable in the long run;222
2007] REFLECTIONS FROM  A POST-KATRINA WO RLD 629
Planning and Modernization Act of 2006 would compel the establishment of “national priorities
for flood damage reduction, navigation, and ecosystem restoration.” S. 2288, 109th Cong. § 3
(2006). It would also require the Corps to “avoid the unwise use of floodplains, . . . protect and
restore [natural ecosystems], and mitigate any unavoidable damage to natural systems.” Id. For a
summary of this bill, see Press Release, Feingold, McCain Introduce Bill to Modernize the Army
Corps of Engineers (Feb. 15, 2006), available at http://mccain.senate.gov/press_office/view_
article.cfm?ID=84. Unfortunately, the bill gained little traction in the 109th Congress. See Tom
Ichniowski, Congress Leaves Much Work to Be Finished, ENGINEERING NEWS-REC., Oct. 9, 2006,
at 9, 9; Katherine McIntire Peters, Corps Reform, GovExec.com (Oct. 25, 2006),
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1006/102506mm.htm.
223. The Feingold-McCain bill addresses institutional concerns by proposing a reinvigorated
oversight role for the national Water Resources Council and annual evaluations of the Corps’
authorized water projects. S. 2288 § 4(b), supra note 222. Even if this bill is stymied, one
institutional reform that does appear to be moving forward at the local level is the creation of
“superboards” for levees in New Orleans, staffed by engineering professionals, rather than political
appointees of the governor as under the current system in Louisiana. Make Levees Larger, Safer,
ADVOC. (Baton Rouge), Sept. 10, 2006, at B10.
224. BABBITT, supra note 14, at 142; see Galloway, supra note 25, at 8.
225. Houck, supra note 56, at 61. 
226. FEMA, The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), http://www.fema.gov/plan/
prevent/floodplain/index.shtm (last visited Feb. 19, 2007). Federally supported flood insurance is
available for homeowners in communities that adopt provisions designed to minimize flood losses.
Id.; see Martin M. Randall, Coastal Development Run Amuck: A Policy of Retreat May be the Only
Hope, 18 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 145, 148-51 (2003). Flood-prone lands, however, continue to be
developed. See Davidson, supra note 71, at 391 (noting that, in spite of the provisions of the NFIP,
“Missouri’s hands-off approach to floodplain development resulted in a race to develop much of
(3) Enhance institutional leadership: Provide the Corps with
primary responsibility for flood control measures, cabined
by clear, ecologically-based standards, with continued
monitoring and oversight through probing judicial review,
and supported by a secure, non-partisan funding source;223
(4) Stop wetlands losses and restore damaged wetlands and
floodplains: Prioritize areas that are most essential for
wildlife reproduction, nesting, and feeding, as well as
areas that, if lost, would jeopardize vulnerable human
communities and cultural resources (the French Quarter
may be one example of the latter point); and, perhaps
most of all,
(5) Recognize that land and water policies are inextricably
linked and plan for both restored flows and open space:224
“[C]ede nature its space.”225
On a related note, but one that reaches beyond the Corps’ programs,
Congress must cut perverse subsidies. Under current policies, flood
insurance payments stimulate construction in vulnerable areas where
flooding and rebuilding occurs and recurs time and time again. The
National Flood Insurance Program and other agricultural and urban
subsidies must be tailored to ensure against floodplain development.226
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the most risky and flood-prone land in the state”). In the St. Louis region, more than $2 billion
worth of new development now stands on land that was submerged by the flood of 1993. Id. at 365.
227. See Houck, supra note 56, at 61.
228. See id.
It would be a mistake to believe that an Interior Rivers Ecosystem Act
that incorporated these recommendations would amount to an
abandonment of all human life along the rivers. People can still live on
uplands and natural ridges that are outside the floods’ and hurricanes’
bulls-eyes, and they can still play in the open space along the rivers’ banks
and on the rivers themselves.  Their experiences will be all the better for227
the aesthetic and ecological improvements that flow from ceding nature its
space.
VI.  CONCLUSION
In examining whether and how to rebuild New Orleans, Oliver Houck
makes an excellent case for what amounts to plain old common sense: Plan
for the resources first, then plan for human development and use in
sustainability zones.  Any resilient solution entails not just flood control,228
engineering, and river management, but also people
management—changing the way people think and interact with their
surroundings. Meanwhile, excessive reliance on CBA and engineering
solutions must give way, and federalism myths must be dispelled so that
federal leadership can take root and enhanced synergies between federal,
state, and tribal programs can grow.
Skeptics will no doubt scoff at an ambitious proposal for an organic act
for the entire interior Missouri-Mississippi ecosystem, claiming that it is
too big or too much of a departure from the status quo. The obvious
response to the skeptics is to ask: “If not this, what? If not now, when?”
True, the enactment of a comprehensive organic act for the nation’s
biggest interior river system will take immense fortitude and foresight,
both of which are often lacking in politicians at every level—federal, state,
and local. But the effects of Hurricane Katrina prove that the time for
action is upon us while the wounds inflicted by misbegotten flood control
and navigational policies are still fresh and the nation’s attention remains
focused on the nation’s interior rivers, floodplains, and wetlands. Surely,
statesmanship like that exhibited by the congressional members who
sponsored the National Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Water Act,
and other landmark environmental laws is not extinct. Visionary leaders
and activists may rise like the phoenix from the ashes of Katrina’s
devastation and guide the nation toward an organic law that promotes a
sustainable, resilient future for both human and ecological communities.
Fairness to future generations demands nothing less.
